Pakistan's Kashmir Policy: CSS Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2025, Q7: The Kashmir dispute is an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition. Evaluate Pakistan’s Kashmir policy for the solution of the problem.

Syllabus topic: Topic XXIII of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Outline for quick revision

Introduction
Why Kashmir Is the Unfinished Agenda of Partition: Logic of Partition; International commitment
Phases of Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: 1947-1965: the UN route and alliances; 1965: the military option; 1972-1989: bilateralism after Simla; 1989-2002: support for the uprising; 2003-2008: flexibility and dialogue; 2008-2019: stop-start dialogue; 2019-2026: internationalisation and deterrence
Evaluation: Successes: Consistent principled position; Keeping the issue alive; Deterrence
Evaluation: Failures and Limitations: Inconsistent methods; The militancy trap; Limited international support; Internal weakness; Kashmiri voice overlooked
Way Forward
Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Pakistan regards Kashmir as the “unfinished agenda of Partition”: a Muslim-majority state, contiguous to Pakistan and linked to it by rivers, roads and culture, which by the logic of 1947 should have joined Pakistan but was taken by India through a disputed accession. Every Pakistani government has made Kashmir a central goal of foreign policy. The question asks for an evaluation of Pakistan’s policy, so this answer briefly explains why Kashmir is “unfinished”, traces the phases of Pakistan’s policy, and then assesses its successes and failures. Its argument is that Pakistan’s principled position has been consistent and has kept the dispute alive, but its methods have been inconsistent, swinging between diplomacy, military means, support for militancy and dialogue, and its internal weakness has limited its influence.

2. Why Kashmir Is the Unfinished Agenda of Partition

Logic of Partition

Partition divided British India on the basis of Muslim-majority areas; Kashmir, with about 77% Muslims and geographic links to Pakistan, fitted that logic, but its Hindu ruler acceded to India in October 1947.

Personality / history: The Quaid-i-Azam is widely quoted as having called Kashmir the “jugular vein” (shah rag) of Pakistan, a phrase that expresses why Pakistan regards Kashmir as vital: its rivers, its Muslim majority and its geographic links all point towards Pakistan.

International commitment

The UN resolutions of 1948-49 and India’s own pledge recognised that the people of Kashmir would decide their future through a plebiscite, a promise never fulfilled.

Official report / policy: UN Security Council Resolution 47 (21 April 1948) and the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, accepted by both India and Pakistan, provided that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided “through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite” held under UN auspices.

Map: The disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Line of Control — **Map:** The disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Line of Control

3. Phases of Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

1947-1965: the UN route and alliances

Pakistan relied on UN diplomacy and on Western allies to press India for a plebiscite. The Soviet vetoes of 1957 and 1962 blocked progress, and India gradually integrated Kashmir.

1965: the military option

Operation Gibraltar sought to spark an uprising in Kashmir but failed, leading to the 1965 war; the Tashkent Declaration (1966) brought no change.

1972-1989: bilateralism after Simla

After the 1971 defeat, Pakistan accepted bilateral negotiations at Simla while maintaining its legal position, and Kashmir faded from the international agenda for nearly two decades.

Official report / policy: Clause 4(ii) of the Simla Agreement (2 July 1972): “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.”

1989-2002: support for the uprising

Pakistan gave “moral, diplomatic and political support” to the Kashmiri uprising; India and the West accused it of backing militancy. Kargil (1999) brought international pressure and damaged Pakistan’s image.

Syllabus book: Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), shows how the state’s own use of jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir created the militancy that later turned against Pakistan itself.

2003-2008: flexibility and dialogue

After 9/11, Pakistan ended support for militancy, agreed to an LoC ceasefire (2003) and pursued the composite dialogue; the back-channel produced the most serious peace effort in decades.

Personality / history: In 2006, President Pervez Musharraf proposed a four-point formula: no change in borders but a “soft” Line of Control with free movement; gradual demilitarisation; self-governance for Kashmiris; and a joint India-Pakistan supervision mechanism. Back-channel talks came close to agreement before Musharraf’s position weakened in 2007.

2008-2019: stop-start dialogue

The Mumbai attacks (2008), Pathankot and Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019) repeatedly derailed dialogue, while India hardened its stance.

2019-2026: internationalisation and deterrence

After India revoked Article 370, Pakistan launched a diplomatic and legal campaign to internationalise the issue; in 2025 it combined a firm military response with diplomacy, gaining international attention, including an offer of mediation.

Current reference: After the ceasefire of 10 May 2025, President Trump offered to work with India and Pakistan to find “a solution concerning Kashmir”; Pakistan welcomed the offer, while India rejected any third-party mediation. In the same crisis, at Pakistan’s request, the UN Security Council held closed consultations on India-Pakistan tensions (5 May 2025).

4. Evaluation: Successes

Consistent principled position

For over seven decades, every Pakistani government, civilian and military, has upheld the right of self-determination and the UN resolutions. This consistency has kept Kashmir recognised internationally as a disputed territory.

Keeping the issue alive

Through the UN, the OIC Contact Group on Kashmir, human rights forums and diplomacy, Pakistan has prevented Kashmir from being accepted as India’s internal matter; UN human rights reports and Security Council consultations in 2019 and 2025 show this.

Official report / policy: The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued its first-ever report on Kashmir in June 2018, and an update in July 2019, documenting killings, the use of pellet guns, arbitrary detention and impunity under laws such as AFSPA, and called for a Commission of Inquiry. India rejected both reports.

Deterrence

Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear deterrence has prevented India from imposing a military solution, as the response of May 2025 showed.

Current reference: In May 2025, after Indian strikes on 7 May, Pakistan responded with Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos on 10 May, and a ceasefire was announced the same day. The civil and military leadership acted in unison, military response, diplomacy and information campaign together, and General Asim Munir was promoted to Field Marshal on 20 May 2025.

The swinging methods of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy

UN diplomacy: 1948-65, 2019-26
Military means: 1947-48, 1965, 1999
Support to uprising: 1989-2002
Bilateral dialogue: 1972, 1999, 2004-08

5. Evaluation: Failures and Limitations

Inconsistent methods

Swinging between war, militancy, bilateralism and internationalisation has confused allies and weakened credibility. Military adventures in 1965 and 1999 failed and cost Pakistan diplomatically.

The militancy trap

Association with armed groups allowed India to portray a freedom struggle as terrorism, and brought Pakistan international pressure, including the FATF grey list (2018-2022).

Limited international support

Major powers prioritise their ties with India, a large market and strategic partner; even many Muslim states have closer economic ties with India.

Syllabus book: Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (2003), traces the Kashmir dispute to the events of 1947, the disputed accession of the Maharaja and the boundary award that gave India a land route to Jammu and Kashmir, and argues that the Kashmiri people’s own voice has been overlooked.

Internal weakness

Political instability, economic dependence on the IMF and internal security problems have reduced Pakistan’s diplomatic weight on Kashmir.

Current reference: Pakistan’s current $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (37 months, approved September 2024), with a $1.4 billion climate Resilience and Sustainability Facility, is its latest of more than twenty IMF programmes since 1958. On 8 October 2026 the IMF reached a staff-level agreement on the fourth review, unlocking about $1.2 billion (total disbursed about $5.7 billion), on conditions including a primary surplus of 2% of GDP, tax reform, phasing out fuel subsidies, timely energy tariff adjustments, privatisation, a tight monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate.

Kashmiri voice overlooked

Pakistan’s policy has sometimes been seen as a territorial dispute between two states rather than a struggle for the rights of the Kashmiri people, which weakens its moral appeal.

6. Way Forward

Pakistan should keep its principled position on self-determination while pursuing it through consistent diplomatic, legal and human-rights channels; build a national consensus on Kashmir policy above party politics; highlight the humanitarian situation in Indian-held Kashmir with credible documentation; involve genuine Kashmiri leadership; strengthen its economy and internal stability, which are the foundation of diplomatic influence; use the new interest of major powers, and its improved standing after 2025, to press for dialogue; and keep the door open to creative, phased solutions.

Current reference: India’s Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Article 370 in December 2023. Elections to the Jammu and Kashmir assembly were held in late 2024 and Omar Abdullah became Chief Minister, but by September 2026 the territory’s statehood had still not been restored, and real power remained with New Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor.

7. Conclusion

Kashmir remains the unfinished agenda of Partition. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has succeeded in keeping the dispute alive, upholding the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination and deterring a military solution. But inconsistent methods, the burden of militancy, limited international support and Pakistan’s own internal weaknesses have prevented a solution. A policy that is principled in aim, consistent and diplomatic in method, centred on the Kashmiri people and backed by a strong economy offers the best hope of completing the agenda of 1947.

Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: CSS 2025 Solved Answer