Pakistan-Iran Relations and Other Neighbours: CSS 2027

Likely CSS 2027 question: Pakistan-Iran relations have swung between brotherhood and mistrust. Analyse the opportunities and irritants in the relationship in the light of the 2026 Iran war, and evaluate Pakistan’s relations with its other neighbours (excluding India).

Variants: “Pakistan’s neighbourhood policy: challenges and prospects”; “Pakistan as a mediator in the Middle East.”

Syllabus topic: XXI, Pakistan’s Relations with Neighbors excluding India. This topic was not asked directly in CSS papers from 2015 to 2026. This is a predicted question, not a confirmed one.

Short answer

Pakistan-Iran relations have moved from brotherhood through mistrust to a cautious partnership. Energy, trade, connectivity and mediation offer real opportunities, while border militancy, sanctions, the Saudi factor and sectarian tension remain irritants. With China a firm partner and Afghanistan hostile, a peaceful neighbourhood is the precondition for Pakistan’s geo-economic vision.

Outline for quick revision

Introduction: four neighbours; 2026 Iran war; thesis
Historical phases: 1947-79; after 1979; 2001-2023; 2024-26
Opportunities: energy; trade; connectivity; mediation
Irritants: border militancy; sanctions and pipeline; Saudi factor; India and Chabahar; sectarianism
Other neighbours: China; Afghanistan; extended neighbourhood
Critical evaluation: strengths and weaknesses
Recommendations and conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Geography has given Pakistan four neighbours with very different relationships: an “all-weather” friend in China, a troubled and now hostile Afghanistan, a hostile India, and Iran, a brotherly Muslim neighbour with which relations have often been close but rarely easy. In 2026, when the US and Israel went to war with Iran, Pakistan found itself both exposed to the fallout and placed at the centre of the peace effort as the host of the Islamabad Talks.

This answer first analyses Pakistan-Iran relations, their history, opportunities and irritants, and then evaluates relations with China, Afghanistan and the wider neighbourhood. It argues that a peaceful neighbourhood is the precondition for Pakistan’s geo-economic vision, and that relations with Iran can be turned from managed mistrust into economic partnership if border security, sanctions and sectarian sensitivities are handled wisely.

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation.”
Quaid-i-Azam, broadcast to the people of the USA, February 1948

Map: Pakistan and Iran: border, ports, pipeline and the January 2024 strikes — **Map:** Pakistan and Iran: border, ports, pipeline and the January 2024 strikes

2. Pakistan-Iran Relations: Historical Phases

The era of brotherhood (1947-79)

Under the Shah, Iran and Pakistan were close allies in Western alliances and regional cooperation, and Iran helped Pakistan in its wars with India. The relationship rested on shared Muslim identity, culture and anti-communist alignment.

Personality / history: Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan in 1947, and the Shah was the first head of state to visit it (1950). The two were allies in CENTO and founded the RCD (1964) with Turkey, which became the ECO in 1985; Iran supported Pakistan in the wars of 1965 and 1971.

Divergence after 1979

The Islamic Revolution, Zia’s Sunni-oriented Islamisation and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry turned Pakistan into a ground for sectarian proxy conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. In Afghanistan, Pakistan backed the Taliban while Iran backed the Northern Alliance, a gap that widened when Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998.

Cautious partnership (2001-2023)

After 9/11 both countries opposed instability in Afghanistan, and trade, border markets and electricity supply to Makran grew. But the gas pipeline stalled, militants operated on both sides of the border, and the arrest of the Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, who had entered from Iran, created mistrust.

Official report / policy: Kulbhushan Jadhav, a serving Indian Navy officer, was arrested in Balochistan on 3 March 2016 and convicted by a Pakistani military court of espionage and terrorism. In its judgment of 17 July 2019, the International Court of Justice rejected India’s request to annul the conviction or release him, but held that Pakistan must provide consular access and an effective review of the conviction.

Crisis and recovery (2024-26)

The relationship survived its most serious test when the two exchanged missile strikes in January 2024, then quickly de-escalated. Pakistan’s support for Iran during the Israel-Iran wars of 2025 and 2026 brought a new warmth.

Current reference: On 16 January 2024 Iran struck alleged Jaish al-Adl targets at Panjgur, killing two children; Pakistan responded on 18 January with Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar against Baloch militant hideouts in Saravan, Iran. Both sides de-escalated within days, and President Raisi visited Pakistan in April 2024.

Current reference: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Pakistan on 2-3 August 2025, thanked it for its support during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, and signed 12 agreements; the two set a $10 billion trade target, against about $3 billion of trade. In August 2026 they agreed to keep border crossings open round the clock.

3. Opportunities

Energy security

Iran has the world’s second-largest gas reserves next door to an energy-starved Pakistan. The pipeline, electricity imports for Balochistan and fuel trade could cut Pakistan’s import bill, if sanctions allow.

Syllabus book: Robert M. Hathaway and Michael Kugelman (eds.), Powering Pakistan (2009), discuss regional pipelines such as Iran-Pakistan and TAPI as answers to Pakistan’s energy shortage, and show how geopolitics and sanctions have kept them on paper.

Trade and border economy

Formal trade is only about $3 billion against a $10 billion target, while informal fuel and goods trade sustains whole districts of Balochistan. Border markets, barter trade and a free trade agreement could turn smuggling into legal livelihoods.

Connectivity

Gwadar and Chabahar, less than 200 km apart, can be complementary rather than rival ports, linking Pakistan and China with Iran, Central Asia and Turkey through the ECO. Road and rail links through Taftan connect Pakistan to Turkey and Europe.

Mediation and diplomatic weight

Pakistan’s ties with both Tehran and Washington, and with Riyadh, made it the main mediator of the 2026 war, raising its global standing. This role is valuable only as long as Pakistan is trusted by all sides.

Current reference: After the US-Israeli war on Iran began on 28 February 2026 and Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan brokered a ceasefire and hosted the Islamabad Talks (11-12 April 2026), the first direct US-Iran talks in decades, with US Vice President JD Vance and Iran’s speaker Ghalibaf; in June the Islamabad Memorandum was signed, though it broke down within about a month and Pakistan remained the main mediator.

4. Irritants and Challenges

Border militancy

Baloch separatists use Iranian territory, and Iranian Baloch militants such as Jaish al-Adl use Pakistani territory, so each side accuses the other. The 909 km border is long, mountainous and porous.

US sanctions and the pipeline

Fear of US sanctions has kept Pakistan from building its part of the pipeline, exposing it to a large arbitration claim. Pakistan’s improving ties with Washington make this dilemma sharper, not easier.

Official report / policy: Under the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement (GSPA, 2009), Iran built most of its section, but Pakistan did not build its 781 km, citing US sanctions on Iran. In September 2024 Iran took Pakistan to arbitration in Paris, reportedly seeking about $18 billion; Pakistan has asked for an extension to 2035, and a verdict is expected in 2027-28.

The Saudi factor

Pakistan’s defence agreement with Saudi Arabia and its large diaspora in the Gulf limit how close it can move to Iran. During the 2026 war, Pakistan had to balance solidarity with Iran against its obligations to Riyadh.

Current reference: When the US and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February 2026, killing Ayatollah Khamenei, Pakistan condemned the attack and Iran’s strikes on Gulf states alike, assured Tehran that Saudi soil would not be used against it, and then mediated. The war hit Pakistan directly: petrol rose by over 40% in a month, the Navy began escorting ships, and protests erupted, including a deadly attempt to storm the US consulate in Karachi.

India and Chabahar

India’s investment in Chabahar, designed to bypass Pakistan to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia, has been a source of suspicion, although US sanctions have since limited the project.

Sectarian sensitivities

Pakistan’s large Shia minority and its Sunni majority mean that Middle Eastern conflicts quickly affect internal peace, as the violent protests of March 2026 showed.

Current reference: Sectarian violence still threatens Muslim unity in Pakistan: a suicide bombing at a mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February 2026 killed more than 30 worshippers. The answer of the ulema has been the kind of consensus Shah Waliullah sought: in Paigham-e-Pakistan (2018), more than 1,800 scholars of all schools of thought jointly declared suicide attacks and sectarian killing forbidden.

5. Relations with Other Neighbours

China: the all-weather partner

China is Pakistan’s closest strategic partner: CPEC has brought large investment, and Chinese weapons proved themselves in May 2025. The main challenges are the security of Chinese workers, repayments to Chinese power producers and slow progress on CPEC’s second phase.

Current reference: By April 2026, the 75th anniversary of Pakistan-China relations, CPEC had brought $25.93 billion of investment, created over 261,000 jobs, added more than 8,000 MW of power and over 510 km of roads (The News, 22 April 2026).

Current reference: Attacks on Chinese nationals remain CPEC’s biggest threat: a suicide bombing near Dasu (March 2024) killed five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, and a bombing outside Karachi airport (October 2024) killed two Chinese workers.

Afghanistan: from “strategic depth” to hostility

The Taliban’s return in 2021 did not bring the friendly neighbour Pakistan expected; instead, TTP attacks from Afghan soil led to air strikes and open conflict in 2025-26, while refugee returns and border closures hurt both peoples.

Current reference: Accusing the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025, leading to the deadliest border clashes since 2021 and a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting resumed, and on 27 February 2026 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” as Pakistan struck targets including Kabul; clashes and strikes continued into September-October 2026.

Current reference: The Torkham crossing and other trade routes were shut after the clashes of October 2025, paralysing bilateral and transit trade, which had peaked at about $2.5 billion in 2010; in August 2026 the Interior Minister announced that crossings and transit routes would reopen, though implementation remained uncertain.

The extended neighbourhood

Pakistan has re-engaged Bangladesh after decades of coldness and is pursuing rail and energy links with Central Asia, though these depend on peace in Afghanistan.

Current reference: After the BNP’s victory in Bangladesh’s February 2026 election, PM Shehbaz Sharif congratulated Tarique Rahman and invited him to Pakistan, continuing the thaw that began with Ishaq Dar’s visit to Dhaka in August 2025.

Current reference: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan signed a framework agreement in Kabul on 17 July 2025 for the feasibility study of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway, which would link Central Asia to Pakistan’s ports.

6. Critical Evaluation

Strengths

Pakistan has kept its relationship with Iran intact through serious crises, deepened its partnership with China and won new diplomatic weight as a mediator. Its neighbourhood policy has shown the value of balance between rival powers.

Syllabus book: Stephen P. Cohen et al., The Future of Pakistan (2011), identify Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours, India, Afghanistan, Iran and China, as one of the regional factors that will decide whether it “muddles through” or declines.

Weaknesses

But two of its four borders, with India and Afghanistan, are hostile, the Iranian border is insecure, and economic links with all neighbours except China remain small. Security concerns, not economics, still dominate the neighbourhood policy that the National Security Policy wants to make geo-economic.

Official report / policy: Pakistan’s first National Security Policy (2022-2026), launched in January 2022, puts economic security at the core of national security and calls for a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics, using Pakistan’s location for connectivity and trade.

Pakistan’s neighbourhood at a glance (2026)

China: strategic partner, CPEC, security concerns
Iran: brotherly but wary, energy, border, mediation
Afghanistan: TTP sanctuaries, border war, refugees

7. Recommendations

Secure the Iran border jointly

Institutionalise joint border commissions, intelligence sharing and coordinated action against militants on both sides, so that incidents like January 2024 are prevented rather than answered with strikes.

Legalise the border economy

Expand border markets, barter trade and electricity imports, and conclude the free trade agreement, giving Baloch communities on both sides a legal stake in peace.

Resolve the pipeline dilemma

Negotiate a settlement with Iran, an extension or a phased start, and seek US understanding on energy needs, as other countries have done, instead of leaving the issue to arbitration.

Balance, not blocs

Continue the policy of balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between the US and China, offering Pakistan as a bridge rather than a member of any camp.

Personality / history: In July 1971, Henry Kissinger flew secretly from Islamabad to Beijing, using Pakistan as the bridge that opened US-China relations, the first great example of Pakistan’s value as a diplomatic crossroads.

A peaceful neighbourhood for geo-economics

Combine firm action against terrorism with dialogue and trade incentives towards Afghanistan, protect CPEC, and pursue connectivity through the ECO and SCO.

8. Conclusion

Pakistan-Iran relations have moved from the brotherhood of the Shah’s era through decades of mistrust to a cautious partnership that survived the strikes of 2024 and grew warmer during the wars of 2025 and 2026. Energy, trade, connectivity and Pakistan’s new role as a mediator offer real opportunities, while border militancy, sanctions, the Saudi factor and sectarian sensitivities remain serious irritants. With China a firm partner and Afghanistan a hostile front, Pakistan’s neighbourhood policy must aim at what the Quaid called “friendliness and goodwill towards all”: a peaceful, connected neighbourhood that allows Pakistan to turn its geography into prosperity.

Pakistan-Iran Relations and Other Neighbours: Likely CSS 2027 Question with Full Answer