Non-State Actors in Pakistan: CSS Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2018, Q5: Define non-state actors. ‘Non-state actors are posing more threat to Pakistan’s national security than threats from external state actors.’ Argue in favour or against.

Syllabus topic: Topic VIII of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Outline for quick revision

Introduction
Defining Non-State Actors
Historical Background: Roots in the Afghan jihad; After 9/11; The national response
Arguments in Favour: Non-State Actors Are the Greater Threat: Scale of violence; Insurgency in Balochistan; Attacks on the economy and CPEC; Sectarianism and extremism; Undermining governance and the federation; Ideological challenge; Deterrence does not work; Criminal and digital networks
Arguments Against: State Actors Remain the Greater Threat: India remains an existential threat; Water as a weapon; States behind non-state actors
Critical Evaluation: A Hybrid Threat: The line between state and non-state has blurred; Judgement
Way Forward: Full implementation of the National Action Plan; Police and counter-terrorism departments; Diplomacy with Afghanistan; Development and political inclusion; Political consensus
Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Security was once understood as the defence of borders against hostile armies. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11, the most frequent threats to states have come from groups that wear no uniform and recognise no border.

Pakistan is a clear example. Its traditional threat is India, but the threat that kills its soldiers and citizens every day comes from terrorists, insurgents, sectarian militias and criminal networks. This answer argues in favour of the statement: non-state actors pose the more immediate and damaging threat to Pakistan today. But it adds an important qualification, the two threats are linked, because hostile states use non-state actors as proxies, and non-state attacks can trigger wars between states.

2. Defining Non-State Actors

Definition: Non-state actors are individuals or organisations that have significant political, economic or military influence but are not part of, or formally allied to, any state. They may be violent (terrorist groups, insurgents, militias, criminal and smuggling networks) or non-violent (NGOs, multinational companies, media and advocacy groups).

3. Historical Background

Roots in the Afghan jihad

The Afghan war of the 1980s brought weapons, drugs, millions of refugees and armed jihadi groups into Pakistan. The state itself supported some of these groups for strategic aims in Afghanistan and Kashmir, creating networks that it later could not control.

Syllabus book: Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), shows how the state’s own use of jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir created the militancy that later turned against Pakistan itself.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

After 9/11

When Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror, many militant groups turned their guns on the Pakistani state. The TTP was formed in 2007, and in the years that followed more than 80,000 Pakistanis, soldiers, police and civilians, are estimated to have been killed.

The national response

Operations Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017), backed by the National Action Plan, cleared militant strongholds in the tribal areas and sharply reduced violence by 2018. This showed that non-state threats can be pushed back when the state acts with unity.

Personality / history: After the Army Public School Peshawar attack (16 December 2014), in which more than 140 people, mostly children, were killed, all political parties and the military agreed on the National Action Plan, the clearest example of civil-military consensus against terrorism.

4. Arguments in Favour: Non-State Actors Are the Greater Threat

Scale of violence

Non-state actors kill far more Pakistanis every year than any foreign army has in decades. Terrorism has returned to levels not seen since the early 2010s, with security personnel paying the heaviest price.

Current reference: In the Global Terrorism Index 2026 (March 2026), Pakistan was ranked the world’s most terrorism-affected country for the first time, with 1,139 deaths in 2025. The TTP alone caused 56% of these deaths, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for over 74% of attacks.

Current reference: According to PICSS, 2025 was Pakistan’s deadliest year in a decade: 3,387 combat-related deaths, including 664 security personnel (the highest since 2011) and 580 civilians, in at least 1,063 attacks.

Insurgency in Balochistan

Baloch separatist groups attack security forces, Punjabi workers, trains and highways, and deliberately target CPEC projects. Their aim is to make Pakistan’s largest province ungovernable and to block its development.

Current reference: On 11 March 2025, the BLA hijacked the Jaffar Express in Balochistan with more than 400 passengers on board; 26 hostages were killed before security forces ended the siege. The state now calls the TTP “Fitna al-Khawarij” and Baloch militant groups “Fitna al-Hindustan”, signalling that it sees them as foreign-backed.

Attacks on the economy and CPEC

Attacks on Chinese workers threaten Pakistan’s most important economic partnership, raise security costs and scare away other investors. In this way terrorism damages the economy as well as taking lives.

Current reference: Attacks on Chinese nationals remain CPEC’s biggest threat: a suicide bombing near Dasu (March 2024) killed five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, and a bombing outside Karachi airport (October 2024) killed two Chinese workers.

Sectarianism and extremism

Sectarian militants and violent religious groups divide society along religious lines and challenge the state’s writ in its cities, including the capital. They also attack minorities and weaken the idea of equal citizenship.

Current reference: Sectarian violence still threatens Muslim unity in Pakistan: a suicide bombing at a mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February 2026 killed more than 30 worshippers. The answer of the ulema has been the kind of consensus Shah Waliullah sought: in Paigham-e-Pakistan (2018), more than 1,800 scholars of all schools of thought jointly declared suicide attacks and sectarian killing forbidden.

Current reference: In October 2025, after violent clashes during a march towards Islamabad, the federal government banned the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Undermining governance and the federation

Terrorism weakens government authority in the border provinces, displaces people and diverts budgets from development to security. It now even shapes constitutional politics, as the emergency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shows.

Current reference: On 11 October 2026, citing terrorism of “unprecedented” intensity, the federal government imposed an emergency (Article 232) and governor’s rule (Article 234) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PTI, which governed the province, called it a political move and said it would challenge it in court.

Ideological challenge

Militants claim religious legitimacy for their violence, which helps them recruit young people and makes them harder to defeat than a conventional army. Countering them therefore requires a religious and ideological answer, not only force.

Syllabus book: Niaz A. Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Armed Conflict in Pakistan (2011), shows that the methods of the Pakistani Taliban, suicide attacks and the killing of civilians, violate both Islamic law and international humanitarian law.

Deterrence does not work

Nuclear weapons and a strong army can deter India, but they cannot deter a suicide bomber. A state threat can be managed through deterrence and diplomacy, whereas a non-state threat hides inside society and strikes without warning.

Criminal and digital networks

Smuggling of fuel and goods across the Afghan and Iranian borders, the narcotics trade, terror financing and online radicalisation feed insecurity and cost the economy billions in lost revenue. These networks often finance and support the militant groups themselves.

5. Arguments Against: State Actors Remain the Greater Threat

India remains an existential threat

Only a state can threaten Pakistan’s survival. India’s conventional superiority, its doctrines of limited war and the crisis of May 2025, when two nuclear powers came into direct conflict, show that the eastern threat remains the most dangerous.

Current reference: In May 2025, after Indian strikes on 7 May, Pakistan responded with Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos on 10 May, and a ceasefire was announced the same day. The civil and military leadership acted in unison, military response, diplomacy and information campaign together, and General Asim Munir was promoted to Field Marshal on 20 May 2025.

Water as a weapon

India’s decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance” shows how a state can threaten Pakistan’s agriculture, economy and food security without firing a shot. No non-state actor can do damage on this scale.

Current reference: After the Pahalgam attack, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) “in abeyance” on 23 April 2025; Pakistan’s National Security Committee declared that any attempt to stop or divert its water would be treated as an act of war. The river dispute that began when the 1947 boundary left key headworks in India is still unresolved.

States behind non-state actors

Pakistan alleges that hostile states sponsor the TTP and BLA, and the Afghan Taliban government gives them safe havens. In this view, many “non-state” threats are really state threats in disguise.

Current reference: Accusing the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025, leading to the deadliest border clashes since 2021 and a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting resumed, and on 27 February 2026 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” as Pakistan struck targets including Kabul; clashes and strikes continued into September-October 2026.

6. Critical Evaluation: A Hybrid Threat

The line between state and non-state has blurred

Non-state actors increasingly act as proxies of states, and their attacks can drag states into war. A single terrorist attack can therefore become the trigger for a dangerous interstate crisis.

Current reference: The attack on tourists at Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir (22 April 2025, 26 killed) was blamed by India on Pakistan-based militants; Pakistan denied involvement and offered a neutral inquiry. Within two weeks the two nuclear states were at war, a non-state attack had triggered a state-to-state crisis.

Judgement

In terms of frequency, casualties, economic damage and internal cohesion, non-state actors are the greater threat today. In terms of Pakistan’s survival, the state threat, above all from India, is the more dangerous. The most dangerous scenario is their combination: a terrorist attack leading to a war between nuclear states.

7. Way Forward

Full implementation of the National Action Plan

The National Action Plan already contains the right measures, but many, such as madrassa registration, action against all armed groups without distinction and a strong NACTA, have been implemented only partly. Consistent implementation, reviewed by the apex committees, is the first priority.

Official report / policy: On 22 June 2024, the Apex Committee of the National Action Plan, chaired by the Prime Minister, approved Azm-e-Istehkam, a renewed counter-terrorism campaign combining military operations with diplomatic cooperation in the region, new laws to close gaps in terrorism prosecutions, and socio-economic measures against extremism.

Police and counter-terrorism departments

Military operations can clear an area, but holding it requires capable provincial police and counter-terrorism departments with modern training, forensics and intelligence. Strengthening them makes gains last and reduces dependence on the army.

Diplomacy with Afghanistan

Pakistan needs a firm but diplomatic approach to end TTP sanctuaries across the border, using regional mediators such as China, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Better border management and trade links can give Kabul an incentive to cooperate.

Development and political inclusion

In Balochistan and the former FATA, jobs, education, fair resource sharing and political dialogue can separate militants from ordinary citizens. People who feel included are far less likely to support insurgents.

How non-state and state threats combine

Hostile state or safe haven: sponsorship, sanctuary
Non-state attack: terrorism, insurgency
State-to-state crisis: border war, nuclear risk

The state should promote the consensus of the ulema against terrorism, such as Paigham-e-Pakistan, regulate madrassas and online extremist content, and keep strict controls on terror financing. Cutting money and recruits weakens militant groups at their roots.

Political consensus

Counter-terrorism must be a national policy agreed by the federation, all provinces and all major parties, not a partisan issue. Disputes between the centre and provinces only give militants space to operate.

Non-state actors threatening Pakistan

Terrorist and insurgent: TTP, BLA, ISKP
Sectarian and extremist: sectarian militias, violent religious groups
Criminal and digital: smuggling, narcotics, cyber and disinformation networks

8. Conclusion

Non-state actors, terrorists, insurgents, sectarian militants and criminal networks, now kill more Pakistanis, cost the economy more and divide society more than any foreign army. In this sense they are the greater threat to Pakistan’s national security. Yet they cannot be separated from state actors: hostile states use them as proxies, sanctuaries across the border sustain them, and their attacks can trigger wars. Pakistan therefore needs a strategy that treats the threat as hybrid, strong deterrence against states, and good governance, policing, development and a clear national narrative against non-state actors.

More preparation: See all CSS Pakistan Affairs past papers by topic.

Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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Non-State Actors in Pakistan: CSS 2018 Solved Answer