Western Defence Pacts: CSS 2022 Solved Answer

Short answer

Pakistan joined the Western defence pacts for security against India, economic survival and the opportunity offered by the Cold War, encouraged by an elite that favoured the West. It gained arms and aid, but the pacts never covered the threat it feared most.

Outline for quick revision

1. Introduction
2. Why Pakistan Joined the Western Pacts: Security against India; Economic weakness; Cold War opportunity; India’s non-alignment and tilt to the USSR; Elite and military preferences; Ties with Muslim states
3. What Pakistan Gained
4. The Cost Pakistan Had to Pay: Strategic costs; Diplomatic costs; Domestic costs
5. Withdrawal and Re-orientation
6. Lessons for Today
7. Conclusion

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1. Introduction

In the mid-1950s, Pakistan abandoned its early neutrality and joined the United States’ Cold War alliance system: the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US (May 1954), SEATO (September 1954), the Baghdad Pact (1955, renamed CENTO in 1959) and a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the US (March 1959). It became, in American eyes, “America’s most allied ally in Asia”.

The question has two parts, why Pakistan joined and what it cost, and this answer gives roughly equal weight to both. It argues that Pakistan joined mainly to strengthen itself against India and rescue a weak economy, not because it feared communism; it gained arms and aid, but paid a heavy diplomatic, strategic and political price, because the pacts were never designed to protect it against India.

2. Why Pakistan Joined the Western Pacts

Security against India

Pakistan emerged from Partition with a much smaller army, little military equipment (much of its share of assets was never delivered) and a war with India over Kashmir in 1947-48. Its leaders saw a powerful ally as the only way to balance India’s superiority.

Economic weakness

The new state had a fragile economy, a refugee crisis and little industry. American economic aid, food and loans offered a way to survive and develop.

Cold War opportunity

The United States wanted allies along the southern border of the Soviet Union and China to “contain” communism. Pakistan’s location, near the Gulf, Afghanistan, the USSR and China, made it valuable, and Pakistan used this to bargain for aid.

India’s non-alignment and tilt to the USSR

India under Nehru chose non-alignment and good relations with Moscow, leaving the Western camp open to Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the US in May 1950, rather than to Moscow, signalled the direction.

Elite and military preferences

Pakistan’s Western-educated bureaucratic and military elite, led by figures such as Ghulam Muhammad and Ayub Khan, favoured close ties with the West, which also strengthened their own position at home.

Ties with Muslim states

The Baghdad Pact included Turkey, Iran and Iraq, allowing Pakistan to link its Western alliance with relations in the Muslim Middle East.

3. What Pakistan Gained

The alliances brought substantial US military aid, tanks, F-86 Sabre and F-104 aircraft and training that modernised the armed forces, and economic aid that helped the high growth of the Ayub years. Pakistan also gained diplomatic support in the West in the 1950s.

4. The Cost Pakistan Had to Pay

Strategic costs

No protection against India

The pacts were directed against communism, not India. When war came in 1965, the US cut off arms to both India and Pakistan, a decision that hurt Pakistan far more because it depended on American weapons. In 1971, the pacts again offered no real help.

Hostility of the Soviet Union

Moscow saw Pakistan as a Western base. It vetoed UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir in 1957 and 1962, supported Afghanistan’s “Pashtunistan” claims, armed India, and in 1971 signed a treaty with India that helped dismember Pakistan.

Diplomatic costs

Isolation from the non-aligned and Arab world

Joining Western pacts alienated the Non-Aligned Movement and Arab nationalists. Egypt’s Nasser was angered by Pakistan’s stance during the Suez crisis (1956), and Pakistan was seen as a Western client in the Afro-Asian world.

Strained relations with neighbours

Afghanistan drew closer to the USSR, and India used Pakistan’s membership to justify its own arms purchases and to portray Pakistan as a tool of the West.

Domestic costs

Strengthening of the military

US aid flowed mainly to the army, strengthening it against civilian institutions and contributing to the coup of 1958 and decades of military dominance.

Dependency and loss of independence

Pakistan’s defence and economy became dependent on US goodwill, which proved unreliable, a pattern repeated in the 1980s and after 2001.

5. Withdrawal and Re-orientation

Disillusioned, Pakistan built a lasting friendship with China from the 1960s, left SEATO in November 1972, withdrew from CENTO in March 1979 and joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979. The experience shaped Pakistan’s later preference for diversified partnerships rather than dependence on a single power.

6. Lessons for Today

The lesson of the 1950s is that alliances must match a state’s real threats and must be balanced by diversified relations. Pakistan’s new defence agreements with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and its balancing between the US and China, should be judged by the same test: do they serve Pakistan’s own security and economic interests, and do they avoid drawing it into others’ conflicts?

7. Conclusion

Pakistan joined the Western defence pacts for security against India, economic survival and the opportunity offered by the Cold War, encouraged by an elite that favoured the West. It gained arms and aid, but the pacts never covered the threat it feared most. In return it earned the hostility of the Soviet Union, isolation from the non-aligned world, an over-strong military at home and dependence on an unreliable ally, costs that became clear in 1965 and 1971. The experience taught Pakistan to diversify its friendships, a lesson that remains central to its foreign policy today.

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Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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