Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations: Conceptual Framework, Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, Why Pakistan Needs a Pragmatic Civil-Military Relationship, Civil-Military Coherence and Pakistan's Role in South Asia

Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations: CSS 2024 Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2024, Q7: In Modern day democracy there must be a Pragmatic Civil-Military relationship to deal all the internal and external security threats. Analyze with reference to the role of Pakistan’s security and stability in South-Asia.

Syllabus topic: Topic VI of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Pakistan’s security environment makes close civil-military cooperation essential, but cooperation must not become domination. The model that works, seen in the National Action Plan and in the unified response of May 2025, is one in which elected leaders set policy and a professional military executes it, through institutional consultation.

Outline for quick revision

  1. Introduction
  2. Conceptual Framework: Civilian control in democracies; Why militaries intervene; The founder’s vision and the Constitution
  3. Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Direct military rule; Structural imbalance; Hybrid arrangements; Constitutional changes in 2025
  4. Why Pakistan Needs a Pragmatic Civil-Military Relationship: The threat environment; Evidence that partnership works
  5. Civil-Military Coherence and Pakistan’s Role in South Asia: Nuclear deterrence and crisis stability; Afghanistan and the western border; CPEC and economic security; Peacekeeping and diplomacy
  6. Risks of Imbalance: Democratic deficit; Polarisation; Accountability and economic cost
  7. Way Forward: A Model of Pragmatic Partnership
  8. Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Civil-military relations describe the balance of power and cooperation between the elected civilian government and the armed forces. In every democracy the military defends the state, but policy is decided by the people’s representatives. Pakistan faces an unusually dense set of threats: a hostile nuclear neighbour, instability in Afghanistan, terrorism, separatist insurgency, hybrid warfare and economic fragility. In such an environment, neither civilian supremacy on paper nor military dominance in practice delivers security. What is needed is a pragmatic partnership under constitutional civilian control, with institutionalised consultation, so that Pakistan can be a stable and responsible actor in South Asia.

2. Conceptual Framework

Civilian control in democracies

Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) argued for “objective civilian control”: the military is given professional autonomy in purely military matters, but stays subordinate to elected authority on policy. In his view, a professional army that stays out of politics is both more effective in war and safer for democracy.

Why militaries intervene

S.E. Finer’s The Man on Horseback (1962) showed that armies step into politics where civilian institutions are weak, parties are divided and the public sees governments as illegitimate. The lesson for Pakistan is that the best guard against intervention is not a weak army but strong, credible civilian institutions.

The founder’s vision and the Constitution

The Quaid set the principle clearly at the very start, and the Constitution later made it law: the armed forces serve the state under the direction of the elected government and take an oath to stay out of politics.

“Don’t forget that you in the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.”
Quaid-i-Azam, address to the Staff College, Quetta, 14 June 1948

Personality / history: The oath of members of the armed forces in the Third Schedule of the Constitution (Article 244) includes the pledge: “I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever.”
Official report / policy: The Constitution of Pakistan settles the principle: under Article 243 “the Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces”, and under Article 245 the armed forces, “under the directions of the Federal Government”, defend Pakistan against external aggression and act in aid of civil power when called upon.

3. Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Direct military rule

Ayub Khan (1958), Zia-ul-Haq (1977) and Pervez Musharraf (1999) took power through coups and together ruled for over three decades. Each time the courts accepted the takeover, which weakened the idea that the Constitution was supreme.

Syllabus book: Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State (1995), shows how Pakistan’s superior courts repeatedly legitimised extra-constitutional rule through the “doctrine of necessity”, from Dosso (1958) to Nusrat Bhutto (1977), weakening constitutionalism.

Structural imbalance

From the start, Pakistan had weak political parties, a strong civil bureaucracy and serious threats from India and Afghanistan. Defence received the largest share of resources, and the army became the most organised institution in the state, which tilted the balance in its favour.

Syllabus book: Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (1995), argues that the contrast of “democratic India” and “authoritarian Pakistan” is misleading: both inherited centralised colonial structures, and in Pakistan the dominance of the bureaucracy and the military over weak political parties shaped the state.

Hybrid arrangements

Since 2008, elected governments have completed their terms and power has passed through elections, but the military has kept strong influence over security, foreign policy and, increasingly, the economy. For example, the army chief sits on the apex committee of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (2023), which fast-tracks foreign investment.

Constitutional changes in 2025

The latest amendment has formalised the military’s institutional position in the Constitution itself. Supporters call it a reform for unified command after the May 2025 conflict; critics argue that it shifts the civil-military balance further towards the military.

Current reference: The 27th Constitutional Amendment (November 2025) created the post of Chief of Defence Forces, held by the army chief with authority over all three services, abolished the post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, gave five-star officers lifetime rank and immunity from prosecution, and created a Federal Constitutional Court. The government called it a reform for command clarity; critics, including the HRCP and senior judges, said it weakened judicial independence and civilian oversight.

4. Why Pakistan Needs a Pragmatic Civil-Military Relationship

The threat environment

External threats

India’s conventional superiority and its doctrines of limited war keep the eastern border under constant pressure, while the western border with Afghanistan and incidents on the Iran border add a second front. Facing threats on more than one border at once, Pakistan cannot afford civil-military rivalry over who makes decisions.

Current reference: In May 2025, after Indian strikes on 7 May, Pakistan responded with Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos on 10 May, and a ceasefire was announced the same day. The civil and military leadership acted in unison, military response, diplomacy and information campaign together, and General Asim Munir was promoted to Field Marshal on 20 May 2025.

Internal terrorism and insurgency

The TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the BLA in Balochistan carry out attacks such as the Jaffar Express hijacking (March 2025). The army can clear an area, but holding and rebuilding it needs police, courts, schools and jobs, which only civilian governments can provide.

Hybrid and non-traditional threats

Disinformation, fifth-generation warfare, climate disasters and economic crisis are not problems that tanks can solve. They need whole-of-government responses in which civilian ministries and the security institutions plan and act together.

Evidence that partnership works

National Action Plan

After the Peshawar school attack, the political parties and the military agreed on a joint agenda against terrorism. Violence fell sharply in the following years, showing what consensus can achieve.

From imbalance to pragmatic partnership

  1. Military rule: 1958, 1977, 1999
  2. Hybrid influence: 2008 onwards
  3. Institutional consultation: NSC, NAP, SIFC
  4. Pragmatic partnership: civilian control and a professional military
Personality / history: After the Army Public School Peshawar attack (16 December 2014), in which more than 140 people, mostly children, were killed, all political parties and the military agreed on the National Action Plan, the clearest example of civil-military consensus against terrorism.

Military operations with political ownership

Zarb-e-Azb (2014), Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017) and Azm-e-Istehkam (2024) were most effective when parliament, the federal government and the provinces owned them. Political backing gave the operations public support and legitimacy, while civilian follow-up helped consolidate the gains.

Nuclear command

The National Command Authority, chaired by the Prime Minister, brings civilian and military leaders together to manage Pakistan’s strategic assets. It is an example of how the most sensitive security decisions can be taken jointly under civilian leadership.

5. Civil-Military Coherence and Pakistan’s Role in South Asia

Nuclear deterrence and crisis stability

In a nuclear neighbourhood, mixed signals from different power centres can cause dangerous miscalculation. In May 2025, coherent military signalling combined with active diplomacy helped secure a ceasefire within days, showing how unity stabilises the region.

Afghanistan and the western border

For decades Pakistan’s Afghan policy has been criticised for running on separate civil and military tracks. Regional stability now requires one consistent, jointly owned policy on the TTP, border management, refugees and trade.

CPEC and economic security

CPEC links Pakistan’s security directly to its economy and to its relationship with China. Protecting Chinese workers and projects requires close coordination between the military, the police and provincial governments.

Current reference: Attacks on Chinese nationals remain CPEC’s biggest threat: a suicide bombing near Dasu (March 2024) killed five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, and a bombing outside Karachi airport (October 2024) killed two Chinese workers.

Peacekeeping and diplomacy

Pakistan is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping and serves on the UN Security Council for 2025-26. A credible, unified voice abroad depends on the civilian and military leadership speaking the same language at home.

6. Risks of Imbalance

Democratic deficit

When the military dominates policy, elected governments lose both authority and the capacity to govern, and voters lose faith that elections matter. Over time this weakens the very institutions that should share the burden of security.

Polarisation

The events of 9 May 2023, when military installations were attacked, and the state response that followed, showed how civil-military tension can divide society and the courts. A divided nation is itself a security weakness that adversaries can exploit.

Current reference: On 8 May 2025, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench (5-2) overturned its October 2023 judgment and allowed the trial of civilians accused in the 9 May 2023 attacks on military installations by military courts.

Accountability and economic cost

Large security spending and the military’s growing economic role reduce transparency and leave less space for civilian priorities such as education and health. Without parliamentary oversight, these choices cannot be properly debated or audited.

7. Way Forward: A Model of Pragmatic Partnership

First, civilian supremacy must be real, not only written in the Constitution: parliament’s defence and security committees should regularly review defence policy and budgets. Second, consultation should be institutional, through the National Security Committee and the National Action Plan’s apex committees, rather than informal arrangements that depend on personalities. Third, civilian capacity in the Ministry of Defence, the police and counter-terrorism departments must be built so that civilians can lead competently. Fourth, the military should remain professional and focused on defence, with transparent defence budgeting. Finally, all parties should agree on a core national security policy that does not change with every government.

Syllabus book: Stephen P. Cohen et al., The Future of Pakistan (2011), argue that Pakistan is most likely to “muddle through”, and identify demography, the economy, militancy and the civil-military balance as the variables that will decide its future.

8. Conclusion

Pakistan’s security environment makes close civil-military cooperation essential, but cooperation must not become domination. The model that works, seen in the National Action Plan and in the unified response of May 2025, is one in which elected leaders set policy and a professional military executes it, through institutional consultation. Such a pragmatic partnership would make Pakistan stronger at home and a more stable, credible actor in South Asia, just as the Quaid intended when he reminded the armed forces that they are the servants of the people.

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Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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