Afghan War Since 1979: A Note on the Afghan War since 1979, Impacts on Pakistan, How Far Are Non-State Actors and Non-Traditional Threats Attributable to the Afghan Wars?, Way Forward

Afghan War Since 1979: CSS 2016 Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2016, Q8: Write note on the Afghan War since 1979 and its impacts on Pakistan. How far the emergence of the “Non-State Actors” and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan can be attributed to the decades-long warfare in Afghanistan?

Syllabus topic: Topic XXIV of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Four decades of war in Afghanistan, from the Soviet invasion to the Taliban’s return, have shaped Pakistan more than any other external event: they brought militancy, weapons, drugs, sectarianism and millions of refugees, cost the economy dearly and strengthened authoritarian rule.

Outline for quick revision

  1. Introduction
  2. A Note on the Afghan War since 1979: Soviet invasion and the jihad (1979-89); Civil war (1989-96); The first Taliban regime (1996-2001); The US-led war (2001-21); The Taliban return and the Pak-Afghan conflict (2021-26)
  3. Impacts on Pakistan: Security impacts; Social and economic impacts; Political and diplomatic impacts
  4. How Far Are Non-State Actors and Non-Traditional Threats Attributable to the Afghan Wars?: Factors pointing to the Afghan wars; Factors pointing to domestic causes; Verdict
  5. Way Forward
  6. Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Afghanistan has hardly known peace: a decade of jihad against Soviet forces, a civil war, the first Taliban regime, twenty years of US-led war, and since August 2021 the return of the Taliban, now in open conflict with Pakistan. Sharing a 2,600-km border, ethnic ties and a long history with Afghanistan, Pakistan has been affected by every phase.

The question has two parts: a note on the war and its impacts, and an evaluation of how far non-state actors and non-traditional threats in Pakistan stem from it. This answer argues that the Afghan wars are the single largest external cause of militancy, drugs, weapons and refugee pressures in Pakistan, but not the only cause, Pakistan’s own state policies, governance gaps and sectarian and ethnic fault lines also played a decisive role.

Definition: Non-state actors are individuals or organisations that have significant political, economic or military influence but are not part of, or formally allied to, any state. They may be violent (terrorist groups, insurgents, militias, criminal and smuggling networks) or non-violent (NGOs, multinational companies, media and advocacy groups).

2. A Note on the Afghan War since 1979

Soviet invasion and the jihad (1979-89)

The Soviet Union invaded in December 1979 to save a communist government. Pakistan, with US and Saudi backing, became the base for the Afghan mujahideen, channelling weapons and training through its intelligence services. The Geneva Accords (April 1988) led to Soviet withdrawal by February 1989.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

Civil war (1989-96)

After the Soviet withdrawal, the US lost interest and the mujahideen factions fought each other for Kabul, destroying the city and creating chaos, warlordism and a booming drug and arms trade.

The first Taliban regime (1996-2001)

The Taliban emerged from refugee madrassas, took Kabul in 1996 and were recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Al-Qaeda found sanctuary under them.

The US-led war (2001-21)

After 9/11 the US overthrew the Taliban; Pakistan became a frontline ally while the Taliban regrouped. The war ended with the Doha Agreement (2020) and the US withdrawal in August 2021.

Official report / policy: The US-Taliban Doha Agreement (29 February 2020) committed the United States to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, and the Taliban not to allow Afghan soil to be used against the US and its allies. Pakistan was publicly credited with facilitating the talks.

The Taliban return and the Pak-Afghan conflict (2021-26)

The Taliban’s return strengthened the TTP, and relations with Pakistan collapsed into border clashes and air strikes.

Current reference: Accusing the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025, leading to the deadliest border clashes since 2021 and a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting resumed, and on 27 February 2026 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” as Pakistan struck targets including Kabul; clashes and strikes continued into September-October 2026.
Five phases of war in Afghanistan

  1. 1979-89: Soviet invasion, jihad
  2. 1989-96: civil war
  3. 1996-2001: first Taliban regime
  4. 2001-21: US-led war
  5. 2021-26: Taliban return, Pak-Afghan conflict

3. Impacts on Pakistan

Security impacts

Militancy and terrorism

Jihadi networks, training camps and battle-hardened fighters from the Afghan wars later turned against Pakistan; the TTP, formed in 2007, has been responsible for most terrorist deaths in the country.

Current reference: In the Global Terrorism Index 2026 (March 2026), Pakistan was ranked the world’s most terrorism-affected country for the first time, with 1,139 deaths in 2025. The TTP alone caused 56% of these deaths, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for over 74% of attacks.

“Kalashnikov culture”

Millions of weapons poured into the region in the 1980s, spreading armed violence into cities such as Karachi and making militancy and crime easier.

Sectarianism

The Afghan jihad coincided with the Iranian revolution and Saudi-Iranian rivalry; foreign-funded madrassas and sectarian groups multiplied in Pakistan in the 1980s.

Current reference: Sectarian violence still threatens Muslim unity in Pakistan: a suicide bombing at a mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February 2026 killed more than 30 worshippers. The answer of the ulema has been the kind of consensus Shah Waliullah sought: in Paigham-e-Pakistan (2018), more than 1,800 scholars of all schools of thought jointly declared suicide attacks and sectarian killing forbidden.

Social and economic impacts

Refugees

Pakistan hosted more than three million Afghan refugees at the peak, one of the largest refugee populations in the world, straining resources, jobs and services but also building deep social ties.

Current reference: Under Pakistan’s repatriation drive that began in September 2023, about 2.5 million Afghans had returned or been deported from Pakistan by June 2026, including more than 670,000 holders of Proof of Registration cards (UNHCR-IOM, June 2026). Pakistan had hosted Afghan refugees for over four decades.

Drugs

Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer of opium; trafficking through Pakistan created a heroin addiction problem and funded criminal and militant networks.

Economic costs

Terrorism, military operations and lost investment have cost Pakistan more than $126 billion since 2001, far exceeding foreign aid received.

Official report / policy: The Pakistan Economic Survey 2017-18 (Ministry of Finance) estimated the direct and indirect cost of the war on terror to Pakistan at $126.79 billion between 2001 and 2018, far more than the US aid received; officials and Parliament later put the total above $150 billion.

Political and diplomatic impacts

Militarisation and authoritarianism

The Afghan jihad prolonged Zia’s military rule and strengthened the security establishment; the war on terror did the same for Musharraf.

Strained relations

Relations with the US swung between alliance and mistrust, India gained influence in Kabul, and Pakistan’s western border became a permanent security concern.

4. How Far Are Non-State Actors and Non-Traditional Threats Attributable to the Afghan Wars?

Factors pointing to the Afghan wars

The origin of militant networks

Most militant groups in the north-west, the TTP and its allies, grew out of the Afghan jihad and the post-2001 war, and still find sanctuary in Afghanistan today.

Official report / policy: The UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported (early 2025) that the Afghan Taliban “continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support”, that new TTP training centres had appeared in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika, and that TTP attacks on Pakistan had “significantly increased”, with over 600 in six months; its later report (February 2026) again confirmed the presence of the TTP and ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Weapons, drugs and refugees

The flow of arms, narcotics and displaced people, key non-traditional threats, came directly from decades of war next door.

Factors pointing to domestic causes

State policy

Pakistan’s own policy of supporting jihadi groups for strategic aims, in Afghanistan and Kashmir, created organisations that later turned on the state.

Syllabus book: Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), shows how the state’s own use of jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir created the militancy that later turned against Pakistan itself.
Personality / history: In October 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, visiting Islamabad, warned that “you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours”, a blunt description of the blowback from militant groups nurtured during the Afghan wars.

Governance vacuum

The tribal areas were governed under colonial-era laws (the FCR) with little development until their merger in 2018, which gave militants space.

Internal fault lines

Sectarianism, ethnic grievances (as in Balochistan, whose insurgency has its own roots), poverty, weak education and an unregulated madrassa sector all predate or exist independently of the Afghan wars.

Verdict

The Afghan wars are the single most important external source of Pakistan’s non-state actors and non-traditional threats, but they became so dangerous because of Pakistan’s own strategic choices and governance failures. Attribution is therefore largely but not wholly to Afghanistan.

5. Way Forward

Pakistan should treat all militant groups equally, without distinction between “good” and “bad”; complete the integration of the merged districts with development and rule of law; regulate madrassas and counter extremist narratives; manage refugee returns humanely and in line with international law; secure the border while keeping trade open; and pursue a consistent, regional approach to Afghanistan that combines pressure on the Taliban over the TTP with engagement on trade and connectivity.

6. Conclusion

Four decades of war in Afghanistan, from the Soviet invasion to the Taliban’s return, have shaped Pakistan more than any other external event: they brought militancy, weapons, drugs, sectarianism and millions of refugees, cost the economy dearly and strengthened authoritarian rule. Much of Pakistan’s non-state violence can be traced to these wars, but not all of it; Pakistan’s own policies and governance gaps turned an external storm into an internal crisis. Lasting security therefore requires both a stable Afghanistan and a Pakistan that has learned the lessons of its own choices.

Related answers on this topic


More preparation: See all CSS Pakistan Affairs past papers by topic.

Last updated: 2 November 2026.

Preparing for CSS 2027? Subscribe to Prep With NAJO WAVE for more Pakistan Affairs answers.

Comments

No comments yet. Why don’t you start the discussion?

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *