Afghan-Owned, Afghan-Led Solution: Meaning of the Principle, Origins and Rationale, Application of the Principle, Why Pakistan Supports the Principle

Afghan-Owned, Afghan-Led Solution: CSS 2021 Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2021, Q3: Explain “Afghans’ owned, Afghans’ led” solution of Afghanistan crisis.

Syllabus topic: Topic XXIV of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

“Afghan-owned, Afghan-led” means that Afghans, not outsiders, must decide their political future, while neighbours and major powers support rather than dictate. The principle grew from the failure of every imposed solution since 1979 and was endorsed by the UN and all major actors.

Outline for quick revision

  1. Introduction
  2. Meaning of the Principle: Afghan-owned; Afghan-led; Regional and international support
  3. Origins and Rationale: The failure of imposed solutions; Afghanistan’s complex society; International endorsement
  4. Application of the Principle: The Doha process; Pakistan as facilitator; Collapse of the process
  5. Why Pakistan Supports the Principle
  6. Limits and Challenges: Ownership by one group; Outside interests continue; Terrorism and spill-over; Humanitarian crisis
  7. The Way Forward
  8. Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

For more than four decades, solutions for Afghanistan were designed outside it, in Moscow, Washington, Islamabad and other capitals, and imposed through invasion, occupation or proxy war. All of them failed. From this experience emerged a principle accepted by the United Nations, the United States, Pakistan, China, Russia and the Afghan parties themselves: a lasting solution must be “Afghan-owned and Afghan-led”.

The question asks for an explanation, so this answer sets out the meaning of the principle, its origins and rationale, how it was applied, why Pakistan supports it, and its limits in practice, especially after the Taliban took power by force in 2021. It argues that the principle is right in theory but has been only partly realised, because ownership has been claimed by one group rather than shared by all Afghans.

2. Meaning of the Principle

Afghan-owned

The future political system, constitution and power-sharing of Afghanistan should be decided by Afghans themselves, and the solution must enjoy the support of the Afghan people, not be a foreign blueprint.

Afghan-led

Negotiations and reconciliation should be conducted by Afghan parties, with outside powers acting as facilitators, guarantors or donors, not as decision-makers.

Regional and international support

The principle does not mean outsiders have no role: neighbours and major powers should support the process, respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty and stop using it as an arena for their rivalries.

3. Origins and Rationale

The failure of imposed solutions

The Soviet-backed communist regime collapsed after Soviet withdrawal; the mujahideen government was torn apart by factions; and the US-backed republic, despite twenty years of support, collapsed in days in August 2021. External imposition produced neither legitimacy nor stability.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

Afghanistan’s complex society

Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others, and strong tribal and religious traditions mean that only a settlement negotiated among Afghans can be accepted across communities.

International endorsement

The phrase became the standard language of the Kabul Process, the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, UN resolutions and the US-Taliban talks.

Official report / policy: UN Security Council Resolution 2513 (10 March 2020) unanimously endorsed the US-Taliban Doha Agreement and called for intra-Afghan negotiations leading to a ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement, reflecting the international consensus that peace must be “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”.

4. Application of the Principle

The Doha process

The US-Taliban Agreement of February 2020 was meant to be followed by intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which began in Doha in September 2020.

Official report / policy: The US-Taliban Doha Agreement (29 February 2020) committed the United States to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, and the Taliban not to allow Afghan soil to be used against the US and its allies. Pakistan was publicly credited with facilitating the talks.

Pakistan as facilitator

Pakistan facilitated the talks by bringing the Taliban to the table and releasing Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, while insisting that it was a facilitator, not a guarantor, of any outcome.

Personality / history: In a letter in December 2018, President Trump asked Prime Minister Imran Khan for help in the Afghan peace talks; Pakistan released Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (October 2018) at US request, and Trump hosted Imran Khan at the White House on 22 July 2019, where he offered to mediate on Kashmir.

Collapse of the process

The intra-Afghan talks stalled; the Afghan government and the Taliban could not agree, and after the US withdrawal the Taliban took Kabul militarily on 15 August 2021, ending the negotiated path.

5. Why Pakistan Supports the Principle

Pakistan has long argued that there is no military solution in Afghanistan and that Afghans must decide their own future. A stable, inclusive Afghanistan would end the flow of refugees and militants, open trade routes to Central Asia and remove a theatre of regional rivalry. Supporting the principle also allowed Pakistan to reject accusations that it sought to control Afghanistan, and to argue against Indian or other outside interference.

6. Limits and Challenges

Ownership by one group

Since 2021, power has been monopolised by the Taliban; women, ethnic minorities and other political groups are excluded. A solution owned by one faction is not truly “Afghan-owned”.

Current reference: In July 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government. Most other states, including Pakistan, still withhold recognition, linking it to an inclusive government, women’s rights (girls remain barred from secondary school) and action against terrorist groups.

Outside interests continue

Neighbours and major powers still pursue their own interests in Afghanistan; Pakistan, India, Iran, China and Russia compete for influence, and the Taliban-Pakistan relationship has turned hostile.

Current reference: In October 2025, the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi, and India upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, a sign that India is building ties with the Taliban as Pakistan’s relations with Kabul deteriorate.
Current reference: Accusing the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025, leading to the deadliest border clashes since 2021 and a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting resumed, and on 27 February 2026 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” as Pakistan struck targets including Kabul; clashes and strikes continued into September-October 2026.

Terrorism and spill-over

An Afghan-led solution must also ensure that Afghan soil is not used against neighbours; the continuing presence of the TTP and ISIS-K shows that this condition has not been met.

Official report / policy: The UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported (early 2025) that the Afghan Taliban “continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support”, that new TTP training centres had appeared in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika, and that TTP attacks on Pakistan had “significantly increased”, with over 600 in six months; its later report (February 2026) again confirmed the presence of the TTP and ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Humanitarian crisis

Sanctions, frozen assets and the end of most foreign aid have deepened poverty, showing that Afghan ownership also needs international support for the Afghan people.

From principle to practice

  1. Principle: Afghans decide, outsiders facilitate
  2. Doha 2020: US-Taliban deal, intra-Afghan talks
  3. August 2021: military takeover, ownership by one group

7. The Way Forward

The principle remains the only realistic basis for peace, but it must be applied in full: an inclusive Afghan government representing all ethnic groups and women; an intra-Afghan dialogue supported by the UN-led Doha process; a regional consensus among Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states, through formats such as the SCO; verifiable commitments that Afghan soil will not be used for terrorism; and humanitarian and economic support that reaches ordinary Afghans.

Syllabus book: Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), shows how the state’s own use of jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir created the militancy that later turned against Pakistan itself.

8. Conclusion

“Afghan-owned, Afghan-led” means that Afghans, not outsiders, must decide their political future, while neighbours and major powers support rather than dictate. The principle grew from the failure of every imposed solution since 1979 and was endorsed by the UN and all major actors. Pakistan supports it because a stable, inclusive Afghanistan is in its own interest. But the Taliban’s military victory in 2021 turned ownership into the monopoly of one group, and terrorism and rivalry continue. The principle will succeed only when ownership is shared by all Afghans and the region respects, and supports, their choice.

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More preparation: See all CSS Pakistan Affairs past papers by topic.

Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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