Afghan Instability and Pakistan: CSS Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2026, Q3: “The instability in Afghanistan continues to influence Pakistan’s internal security, regional diplomacy, and counter terrorism strategy”. Critically examine the above statement and suggest policy measures to address the issue/challenge.

Syllabus topic: Topic XXIV of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Outline for quick revision

Introduction
Influence on Pakistan’s Internal Security: Sanctuaries for the TTP; Record levels of violence; Baloch insurgency and ISIS-K; Pressure on governance in KP
Influence on Regional Diplomacy: From “strategic depth” to hostility; India’s return to Kabul; Connectivity blocked; Refugees and humanitarian diplomacy; Great-power and regional engagement
Influence on Counter-Terrorism Strategy: From dialogue to force; Naming and framing; Limits of a military approach
Critical Examination: Why the statement is largely valid; Why it is not the whole picture; A two-way relationship
Policy Measures: A coherent Afghanistan policy; Strengthen internal counter-terrorism; Develop the border regions; Smart border management; Humane refugee policy; Regional connectivity as an incentive
Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021, many in Pakistan expected a friendly western neighbour and an end to India’s influence in Afghanistan. Instead, the Taliban’s return emboldened the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), terrorism in Pakistan rose to its highest level in a decade, and by 2025-26 the two countries were engaged in border clashes and air strikes.

The statement identifies three areas of influence, internal security, regional diplomacy and counter-terrorism strategy. This answer examines each critically, then suggests policy measures. It argues that the statement is largely valid, Afghanistan’s instability is the most important external driver of Pakistan’s security problems, but that Pakistan’s own governance and policy choices determine how severe that influence becomes.

Current reference: Accusing the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025, leading to the deadliest border clashes since 2021 and a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting resumed, and on 27 February 2026 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” as Pakistan struck targets including Kabul; clashes and strikes continued into September-October 2026.

Map: The Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Durand Line), main crossings and TTP centres reported by the UN — **Map:** The Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Durand Line), main crossings and TTP centres reported by the UN

2. Influence on Pakistan’s Internal Security

Sanctuaries for the TTP

The TTP and its splinter groups operate from Afghan territory with the tolerance, and, according to the UN, the support, of the Taliban, launching attacks across the border into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Official report / policy: The UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported (early 2025) that the Afghan Taliban “continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support”, that new TTP training centres had appeared in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika, and that TTP attacks on Pakistan had “significantly increased”, with over 600 in six months; its later report (February 2026) again confirmed the presence of the TTP and ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Record levels of violence

Terrorist deaths and attacks have reached their highest level in over a decade, making Pakistan the world’s most terrorism-affected country.

Current reference: In the Global Terrorism Index 2026 (March 2026), Pakistan was ranked the world’s most terrorism-affected country for the first time, with 1,139 deaths in 2025. The TTP alone caused 56% of these deaths, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for over 74% of attacks.

Current reference: According to PICSS, 2025 was Pakistan’s deadliest year in a decade: 3,387 combat-related deaths, including 664 security personnel (the highest since 2011) and 580 civilians, in at least 1,063 attacks.

Baloch insurgency and ISIS-K

Pakistan alleges that Baloch separatist groups also find shelter in Afghanistan, while ISIS-K threatens both countries and attacked Shia worshippers in Pakistan.

Current reference: On 11 March 2025, the BLA hijacked the Jaffar Express in Balochistan with more than 400 passengers on board; 26 hostages were killed before security forces ended the siege. The state now calls the TTP “Fitna al-Khawarij” and Baloch militant groups “Fitna al-Hindustan”, signalling that it sees them as foreign-backed.

Pressure on governance in KP

Rising violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has strained the province’s governance and led to emergency measures, deepening federal-provincial and political tensions.

Current reference: On 11 October 2026, citing terrorism of “unprecedented” intensity, the federal government imposed an emergency (Article 232) and governor’s rule (Article 234) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PTI, which governed the province, called it a political move and said it would challenge it in court.

3. Influence on Regional Diplomacy

From “strategic depth” to hostility

The belief that a Taliban government would be Pakistan’s friend has collapsed; relations have moved from optimism in 2021 to open conflict in 2025-26, with mediation by Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and China producing only temporary ceasefires.

India’s return to Kabul

India has used Pakistan-Taliban tensions to rebuild its presence in Afghanistan.

Current reference: In October 2025, the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi, and India upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, a sign that India is building ties with the Taliban as Pakistan’s relations with Kabul deteriorate.

Connectivity blocked

Instability has frozen plans to link Pakistan with Central Asia through Afghanistan, the trans-Afghan railway, TAPI and CASA-1000, and border closures have paralysed trade.

Current reference: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan signed a framework agreement in Kabul on 17 July 2025 for the feasibility study of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway, which would link Central Asia to Pakistan’s ports.

Current reference: The Torkham crossing and other trade routes were shut after the clashes of October 2025, paralysing bilateral and transit trade, which had peaked at about $2.5 billion in 2010; in August 2026 the Interior Minister announced that crossings and transit routes would reopen, though implementation remained uncertain.

Refugees and humanitarian diplomacy

Pakistan’s large-scale repatriation of Afghans has drawn criticism from the UN and rights groups and fuelled hostility in Afghanistan.

Current reference: Under Pakistan’s repatriation drive that began in September 2023, about 2.5 million Afghans had returned or been deported from Pakistan by June 2026, including more than 670,000 holders of Proof of Registration cards (UNHCR-IOM, June 2026). Pakistan had hosted Afghan refugees for over four decades.

Great-power and regional engagement

China, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states share Pakistan’s concern about terrorism from Afghanistan, creating space for regional diplomacy through the SCO and trilateral formats.

Current reference: The SCO summit at Tianjin (August-September 2025) adopted a declaration that condemned not only the Pahalgam attack in India but also the Jaffar Express and Khuzdar attacks in Pakistan, and announced the establishment of an SCO Development Bank. Earlier, in June 2025, India refused to sign the joint statement of SCO defence ministers at Qingdao because it mentioned Balochistan but not Pahalgam.

4. Influence on Counter-Terrorism Strategy

From dialogue to force

After talks with the TTP mediated by the Taliban (2021-22) failed, Pakistan launched Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024) and moved to cross-border strikes against TTP hideouts, a major shift in strategy.

Naming and framing

The state now calls the TTP “Fitna al-Khawarij” and Baloch militants “Fitna al-Hindustan”, framing them as foreign-backed and religiously deviant.

Limits of a military approach

Cross-border strikes risk civilian casualties, international criticism and a wider war, while the TTP’s networks inside Pakistan require policing, intelligence and governance, not only military force.

Syllabus book: Niaz A. Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Armed Conflict in Pakistan (2011), shows that the methods of the Pakistani Taliban, suicide attacks and the killing of civilians, violate both Islamic law and international humanitarian law.

5. Critical Examination

Why the statement is largely valid

The evidence, UN reports, record terrorist violence, border wars and blocked trade, shows that Afghanistan’s instability shapes Pakistan’s security, diplomacy and counter-terrorism more than any other external factor.

Why it is not the whole picture

Pakistan’s own past policy of backing the Taliban, weak governance and policing in the merged districts, political polarisation and economic weakness make it more vulnerable; even a stable Afghanistan would not by itself end terrorism in Pakistan.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

A two-way relationship

Pakistan’s actions, border closures, refugee deportations and air strikes, also affect Afghanistan’s stability, so the relationship is one of mutual influence, not one-way spill-over.

6. Policy Measures

A coherent Afghanistan policy

Build a national consensus, civil and military, federal and provincial, on a single Afghanistan policy, made through Parliament rather than ad hoc decisions.

How Afghan instability reaches Pakistan

Internal security: TTP sanctuaries, record violence, KP strain
Regional diplomacy: hostile Kabul, India’s return, blocked connectivity
CT strategy: from talks to strikes; limits of force

Use bilateral talks, regional mediators (China, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) and the SCO to press the Taliban to act against the TTP, linking trade, transit and recognition-related issues to verifiable steps.

Strengthen internal counter-terrorism

Implement the National Action Plan fully, build capable police and CTDs in KP and Balochistan, cut terror financing and counter extremist narratives through the ulema’s consensus.

Personality / history: After the Army Public School Peshawar attack (16 December 2014), in which more than 140 people, mostly children, were killed, all political parties and the military agreed on the National Action Plan, the clearest example of civil-military consensus against terrorism.

Develop the border regions

Invest in the merged districts and Balochistan, jobs, schools, courts and local government, so that militants lose recruits and support.

Smart border management

Complete the fencing and modernise crossings, but keep trade and people-to-people movement open through regulated routes, because economic interdependence is also a tool of stability.

Humane refugee policy

Manage returns gradually, in coordination with UNHCR, and offer legal status to long-settled Afghans with skills and families in Pakistan.

Regional connectivity as an incentive

Offer the Taliban the benefits of trade, transit and connectivity to Central Asia in return for cooperation against terrorism.

7. Conclusion

Instability in Afghanistan continues to shape Pakistan’s internal security through TTP sanctuaries and record violence, its regional diplomacy through a hostile Kabul, India’s return and blocked connectivity, and its counter-terrorism strategy, which has moved from talks to cross-border force. The statement is largely valid, but Pakistan’s vulnerabilities are also of its own making. A coherent national policy that combines firm diplomacy with the Taliban, strong internal counter-terrorism, development of the border regions, humane refugee management and the incentive of regional trade offers the best way to turn the Afghan challenge into a manageable one.

Afghan Instability and Pakistan: CSS 2026 Solved Answer