Delay in Dam Construction in Pakistan: Why Dams Matter for Pakistan, Causes of Delay, The Cost of Delay, the "Collateral Loss", Current Progress

Delay in Dam Construction in Pakistan: CSS 2019 Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2019, Q7: Critically analyze the key causes of delaying construction of dams in Pakistan. Give some suggestions to revert this collateral loss.

Syllabus topic: Topic XVII of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Pakistan has delayed building dams mainly because of political disputes among provinces, short-term politics, financial constraints, a policy bias towards thermal power, weak planning and security problems, not because of a lack of sites or engineering skill. The cost has been water scarcity, expensive electricity and greater flood losses, at a time when climate change and India’s stance on the Indus Waters Treaty make storage more urgent than ever.

Outline for quick revision

  1. Introduction
  2. Why Dams Matter for Pakistan
  3. Causes of Delay: Political causes; Financial causes; Policy and governance causes; Technical, social and security causes
  4. The Cost of Delay, the “Collateral Loss”
  5. Current Progress
  6. Suggestions to Reverse the Loss: Build consensus through the CCI; A protected, long-term water plan; Innovative financing; Small and medium dams; Fair resettlement and local benefit; Demand-side reforms; Security and timely execution
  7. Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Dams store water for irrigation and drinking, generate cheap and clean electricity and control floods. Pakistan built two great dams, Mangla (1967) and Tarbela (1976), under the Indus Basin Project, but for almost fifty years after Tarbela it did not complete another large storage dam. Meanwhile its population tripled, reservoirs lost capacity to silt, and floods wasted huge volumes of water.

The question asks for a critical analysis of the causes and suggestions, so this answer covers both in roughly equal measure. It argues that the delay has been caused less by technical problems than by a lack of political consensus, finance and continuity, and that the remedy lies in consensus-building, sustainable financing and a national water strategy.

Official report / policy: Pakistan’s first National Water Policy, approved by the Council of Common Interests in April 2018 and signed by the Prime Minister and all four Chief Ministers, set the goal of adding about 10 MAF of storage, improving irrigation efficiency and declaring a national water emergency. Pakistan can store only about 30 days of its river flows.

2. Why Dams Matter for Pakistan

Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, with per capita water availability falling towards scarcity levels. Agriculture, which employs over a third of the workforce, depends on irrigation; hydropower is the cheapest source of electricity; and floods, as in 2022 and 2025, cause enormous losses while much of the floodwater flows unused into the sea.

Official report / policy: The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment of the 2022 floods (Government of Pakistan with the World Bank, ADB, EU and UN, October 2022) put damages at $14.9 billion and economic losses at $15.2 billion, with reconstruction needs of $16.3 billion; more than 33 million people were affected and about 1,700 died.
Map: Pakistan's major dams: existing, under construction and disputed
Map: Pakistan’s major dams: existing, under construction and disputed

3. Causes of Delay

Political causes

Lack of inter-provincial consensus

The Kalabagh Dam is the clearest example: technically ready for decades, it has been opposed by Sindh, which fears less water downstream, and by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which fears flooding of Nowshera and displacement. The provincial assemblies of Sindh, KP and Balochistan passed resolutions against it, and it became a symbol of mistrust between provinces.

Syllabus book: Katharine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan (2007), argues that India’s multi-unit, power-sharing federation contained ethnic conflict, while Pakistan’s centralisation, One Unit, parity and military rule, alienated the Bengalis and the smaller provinces.

Political instability and short-termism

Frequent changes of government and short electoral cycles discouraged projects that take ten years or more to complete; each new government announced its own priorities, and dams were inaugurated more often than built.

Sindh’s downstream concerns

Sindh’s fear of reduced flows below Kotri and sea-water intrusion into the Indus delta has made any new upstream storage politically sensitive.

Financial causes

Huge costs and fiscal crisis

Large dams cost billions of dollars, Diamer-Bhasha alone was estimated at about $14 billion, at a time when Pakistan faced chronic deficits and IMF programmes.

Current reference: Pakistan’s current $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (37 months, approved September 2024), with a $1.4 billion climate Resilience and Sustainability Facility, is its latest of more than twenty IMF programmes since 1958. On 8 October 2026 the IMF reached a staff-level agreement on the fourth review, unlocking about $1.2 billion (total disbursed about $5.7 billion), on conditions including a primary surplus of 2% of GDP, tax reform, phasing out fuel subsidies, timely energy tariff adjustments, privatisation, a tight monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate.

International financing difficulties

The World Bank and ADB were reluctant to finance Diamer-Bhasha because it lies in Gilgit-Baltistan, which India disputes; China’s conditions led Pakistan to drop it from CPEC in 2017.

Policy and governance causes

Preference for thermal power

The power policies of 1994 and 2002 favoured quick-to-build oil-and gas-fired plants by private producers, which created expensive capacity payments and diverted attention from hydropower.

Syllabus book: Robert M. Hathaway and Michael Kugelman (eds.), Powering Pakistan (2009), argue that Pakistan’s energy crisis is mainly a crisis of governance, pricing and planning rather than a lack of resources.

Weak planning and implementation

Feasibility studies, land acquisition, resettlement and contracts have repeatedly been delayed; there was no consistent long-term plan for water storage.

Syllabus book: Ziad Alahdad, Pakistan’s Energy Sector: From Crisis to Crisis, Breaking the Chain (PIDE, 2012), attributes recurring energy crises to delays, weak implementation and reform reversals, and calls for Integrated Energy Planning.

Technical, social and security causes

Geological and environmental challenges

Sites in the northern mountains face seismic risk, difficult access and heavy silt; environmental concerns over the delta and displacement must be addressed.

Resettlement and local disputes

Land acquisition and compensation disputes, such as those over the Diamer-Bhasha site between Gilgit-Baltistan and KP, have slowed work.

Security threats

Attacks on workers, including the Dasu attacks on Chinese engineers, have raised costs and caused delays.

Current reference: Attacks on Chinese nationals remain CPEC’s biggest threat: a suicide bombing near Dasu (March 2024) killed five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, and a bombing outside Karachi airport (October 2024) killed two Chinese workers.

4. The Cost of Delay, the “Collateral Loss”

The delay has cost Pakistan dearly: storage of only about 30 days of flows against several months in many countries; reservoirs losing capacity to sedimentation; dependence on expensive imported fuel for electricity and circular debt; water shortages for agriculture during sowing seasons; and greater flood damage. It also leaves Pakistan more vulnerable to Indian manipulation of flows.

Current reference: After the Pahalgam attack, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) “in abeyance” on 23 April 2025; Pakistan’s National Security Committee declared that any attempt to stop or divert its water would be treated as an act of war. The river dispute that began when the 1947 boundary left key headworks in India is still unresolved.

5. Current Progress

Current reference: Pakistan’s first major new dams since Tarbela (1976) are under construction: Mohmand (800 MW) and Dasu (4,320 MW) are due around 2026-27, while Diamer-Bhasha (about 8 MAF of storage, 4,500 MW), contracted in May 2020 at Rs 442 billion, is not expected before the end of the decade. The 2018 dam fund launched by the Chief Justice raised only about Rs 10 billion.

6. Suggestions to Reverse the Loss

Build consensus through the CCI

Resolve disputed projects through the Council of Common Interests, with independent technical studies, guaranteed downstream flows for Sindh under the 1991 Accord and transparent telemetry of water use. Prioritise dams that all provinces accept, and keep Kalabagh for when trust exists.

A protected, long-term water plan

Implement the National Water Policy as a national commitment that no government can abandon, with dams ring-fenced in the federal budget.

Innovative financing

Use public-private partnerships, green and diaspora bonds, multilateral climate funds and water and power charges, reducing reliance on a single lender.

Four clusters of causes

  • Political: no consensus, instability
  • Financial: cost, donors, disputed site
  • Policy: thermal bias, weak planning
  • Technical and security: geology, resettlement, attacks
Official report / policy: In its NDC 3.0 (September 2025) under the Paris Agreement, Pakistan pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 50% below business-as-usual by 2035, 17% unconditionally and 33% conditional on about $565 billion of international finance.

Small and medium dams

Build small and medium dams and recharge structures in every province, which are quicker, cheaper and less controversial, and help capture floodwater.

Fair resettlement and local benefit

Give displaced communities fair compensation, jobs and a share of royalties, so that local people support projects.

Demand-side reforms

Reduce water losses by lining canals, using drip and sprinkler irrigation and pricing water to reflect its value, the cheapest way to “create” new water.

Security and timely execution

Provide strong security for project sites and workers, and hold WAPDA and contractors accountable for deadlines.

7. Conclusion

Pakistan has delayed building dams mainly because of political disputes among provinces, short-term politics, financial constraints, a policy bias towards thermal power, weak planning and security problems, not because of a lack of sites or engineering skill. The cost has been water scarcity, expensive electricity and greater flood losses, at a time when climate change and India’s stance on the Indus Waters Treaty make storage more urgent than ever. With consensus through federal institutions, protected long-term planning, innovative finance, small dams and efficient water use, Pakistan can turn this collateral loss into water security.

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More preparation: See all CSS Pakistan Affairs past papers by topic.

Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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