Pakistan-US Relations: CSS Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2018, Q7: Discuss the changing trends in Pakistan-US relations since 2001.

CSS 2020, Q8: Discuss revival of Pak-US relations in context of present US-Taliban peace process.

CSS 2022, Q8: Discuss the issues and mistrust in US-Pakistan relations after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan. (One answer covers all three: for 2018, use the whole chronology; for 2020, expand Section 5; for 2022, expand Section 6.)

Syllabus topic: Topic XIV of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Outline for quick revision

Introduction
Phase I (2001-2010): Strategic Alliance: Partnership in the war on terror; From military to civilian engagement
Phase II (2011-2018): Crisis and “Do More”: The year of crises; Mistrust over Afghanistan; The India factor
The Changing Trends since 2001
Phase III (2018-2021): Revival through the US-Taliban Peace Process: Why Washington needed Pakistan again; Pakistan’s facilitation; Signs of revival; Limits of the revival
Phase IV (2021-2024): Issues and Mistrust after the US Withdrawal: Blame for the Taliban victory; Political tensions; Afghanistan and terrorism; Strategic divergence; Some cooperation continued
Phase V (2025-2026): A Transactional Warmth: New warmth under Trump; Pakistan as mediator; The challenge of balance
Way Forward
Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

Pakistan-US relations have always swung between close embrace and bitter estrangement. The alliance of the 1950s, the rift of 1965 and 1971, the Afghan jihad partnership of the 1980s and the sanctions of the 1990s set a pattern that continued after 2001: closeness when Washington needs Pakistan, distance when it does not.

Since 9/11 the relationship has passed through five phases, alliance, crisis, revival through the Afghan peace process, mistrust after the US withdrawal, and a surprising new warmth in 2025-26. The underlying trend is a shift from an Afghanistan-centred security relationship to a narrower, more transactional partnership based on counter-terrorism, trade, minerals and diplomacy.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

2. Phase I (2001-2010): Strategic Alliance

Partnership in the war on terror

Pakistan joined the US-led coalition, provided logistics, bases and intelligence, and captured senior al-Qaeda leaders. The US lifted sanctions, rescheduled debt, made Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally” (2004) and provided aid and Coalition Support Fund reimbursements.

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
US President George W. Bush, address to Congress, 20 September 2001

From military to civilian engagement

After democracy returned in 2008, the US tried to broaden the relationship: the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act (2009) promised $7.5 billion of civilian aid over five years, and a Strategic Dialogue was launched in 2010. But the conditions attached to the aid angered the military and public opinion.

3. Phase II (2011-2018): Crisis and “Do More”

The year of crises

In 2011 the Raymond Davis shooting (January), the US raid on Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad (2 May) and the NATO attack on the Salala check-post that killed 24 soldiers (26 November) brought relations to their lowest point. Pakistan closed NATO supply routes for seven months.

Mistrust over Afghanistan

The US accused Pakistan of sheltering the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network; Pakistan accused the US of ignoring its sacrifices and favouring India in Afghanistan. President Trump’s South Asia strategy (August 2017) publicly blamed Pakistan, and security assistance was suspended in January 2018.

Personality / history: On 1 January 2018, President Trump wrote that the US had “foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years” and received “nothing but lies & deceit”, the clearest expression of the “do more” mistrust. Most of that money was in fact Coalition Support Fund reimbursements for costs Pakistan had already borne.

The India factor

The US-India strategic partnership, the civil nuclear deal of 2008 and later defence agreements, convinced Pakistan that Washington saw India as its long-term partner in Asia and Pakistan only as a short-term instrument.

4. The Changing Trends since 2001

Across these phases several trends are clear: the relationship has narrowed from a broad alliance to a set of specific interests; it has become transactional, tied to US needs in Afghanistan; China has replaced the US as Pakistan’s main strategic partner; India has replaced Pakistan as America’s main partner in South Asia; and economic cooperation, trade, investment and minerals, is slowly becoming more important than aid.

5. Phase III (2018-2021): Revival through the US-Taliban Peace Process

Why Washington needed Pakistan again

The US wanted to end its longest war, and only Pakistan had the influence to bring the Taliban to the table.

The rollercoaster of Pakistan-US relations since 2001

2001-10: alliance
2011-18: crisis, “do more”
2018-21: revival via peace process
2021-24: mistrust after withdrawal
2025-26: transactional warmth

Personality / history: In a letter in December 2018, President Trump asked Prime Minister Imran Khan for help in the Afghan peace talks; Pakistan released Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (October 2018) at US request, and Trump hosted Imran Khan at the White House on 22 July 2019, where he offered to mediate on Kashmir.

Pakistan’s facilitation

Pakistan facilitated the talks between US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban in Doha, which led to the agreement of February 2020.

Official report / policy: The US-Taliban Doha Agreement (29 February 2020) committed the United States to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, and the Taliban not to allow Afghan soil to be used against the US and its allies. Pakistan was publicly credited with facilitating the talks.

Signs of revival

The US restored Pakistan’s participation in its military training programme (IMET) in December 2019, praised Pakistan’s role publicly, and the language of “do more” gave way to cooperation. Pakistan, in turn, hoped to move the relationship towards trade and investment.

Limits of the revival

The revival was narrow and tied to Afghanistan. Security aid was not restored, Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list, and differences over India and China persisted.

6. Phase IV (2021-2024): Issues and Mistrust after the US Withdrawal

Blame for the Taliban victory

After the fall of Kabul (15 August 2021) and the chaotic US withdrawal, many in Washington blamed Pakistan for the Taliban’s victory. Secretary of State Blinken told Congress that the US would reassess its relationship with Pakistan.

Political tensions

President Biden never telephoned Prime Minister Imran Khan; Imran Khan’s “absolutely not” to US bases (June 2021) and his allegation in 2022 that a US “cipher” was behind his removal deepened distrust and anti-American sentiment.

Afghanistan and terrorism

The return of the Taliban strengthened the TTP, and attacks in Pakistan rose. The US, no longer present in Afghanistan, had less interest in Pakistan’s security problems, while Pakistan felt abandoned, as it had after 1989.

Strategic divergence

The US focused on competition with China and partnership with India; Pakistan’s closeness to China and CPEC became a source of suspicion. Disputes over Pakistan’s missile programme added to the mistrust.

Official report / policy: On 19 December 2024, the US government sanctioned Pakistan’s National Development Complex and three other entities over the long-range ballistic missile programme; Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer claimed Pakistan was developing missiles able to strike “well beyond South Asia, including in the United States”. Pakistan rejected the sanctions as biased.

Some cooperation continued

Despite the mistrust, the US approved a $450 million F-16 sustainment package (2022), helped after the 2022 floods and supported Pakistan’s IMF programmes, showing that neither side wanted a complete break.

7. Phase V (2025-2026): A Transactional Warmth

New warmth under Trump

Counter-terrorism cooperation, Pakistan’s handling of the May 2025 crisis and Trump’s interest in trade and minerals produced an unexpected thaw.

Current reference: In March 2025, in his first address to Congress of his second term, President Trump thanked “the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster”, Mohammad Sharifullah, an ISIS-K suspect in the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing at Kabul airport that killed 13 US troops, showing that counter-terrorism cooperation still underpins the relationship.

Current reference: Under Trump’s second term, ties warmed sharply: Field Marshal Asim Munir was hosted for lunch at the White House (June 2025); a trade deal (July 2025) set a 19% US tariff on Pakistani goods and promised cooperation on oil reserves; Shehbaz Sharif and Munir met Trump in the Oval Office (25 September 2025); and under a $500 million minerals MoU (September 2025), Pakistan sent its first shipment of rare earths and critical minerals to the US in October 2025.

Pakistan as mediator

Pakistan’s role in the 2026 US-Iran talks gave it renewed diplomatic value in Washington.

Current reference: After the US-Israeli war on Iran began on 28 February 2026 and Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan brokered a ceasefire and hosted the Islamabad Talks (11-12 April 2026), the first direct US-Iran talks in decades, with US Vice President JD Vance and Iran’s speaker Ghalibaf; in June the Islamabad Memorandum was signed, though it broke down within about a month and Pakistan remained the main mediator.

The challenge of balance

Pakistan must benefit from US trade and investment without damaging its strategic partnership with China; the US, for its part, values India far more in its Asia strategy.

8. Way Forward

Both countries should move from a security-and-aid relationship to one based on trade, investment, technology, education and the large Pakistani diaspora in America. Counter-terrorism cooperation should be institutionalised through regular dialogue rather than crisis contacts; Pakistan should keep a balanced policy between the US and China and avoid being drawn into bloc politics; and public diplomacy is needed to reduce the deep mistrust that exists in both countries.

Syllabus book: Stephen P. Cohen et al., The Future of Pakistan (2011), argue that Pakistan is most likely to “muddle through”, and identify demography, the economy, militancy and the civil-military balance as the variables that will decide its future.

9. Conclusion

Since 2001, Pakistan-US relations have risen and fallen with America’s needs in Afghanistan: alliance after 9/11, crisis in 2011, revival through the Doha peace process, mistrust after the withdrawal of 2021, and a new transactional warmth in 2025-26. The constant trend is that the relationship has been driven by short-term interests rather than long-term trust. A stable partnership will come only when it rests on economic cooperation and mutual respect for each other’s interests, including Pakistan’s partnership with China, rather than on the next crisis.

Pakistan-US Relations: CSS 2018, 2020 and 2022 Solved Answer