Proxy War and Internal Security: CSS Solved Answer

Exam question: CSS 2020, Q5: What is meant by the term “Proxy War”? Are there any extrinsic factors at play in the internal security situation of Pakistan?

Syllabus topic: Topic XXV of the CSS Pakistan Affairs syllabus.

Short answer

Outline for quick revision

Introduction
Understanding Proxy War: Features; Why states use proxies; Historical examples; Pakistan’s own experience
External Factors in Pakistan’s Internal Security: Indian involvement in Balochistan and terrorism; Alleged targeted killings; Afghan sanctuaries; Sectarian proxy rivalry; Information warfare; Great-power competition and CPEC; The state’s framing
Critical Evaluation: External factors are real; But internal factors decide their success; Pakistan’s credibility
How Pakistan Should Counter Proxy Wars
Conclusion

Reference colours:
Quotation / documentPersonality / historySyllabus bookCurrent referenceOfficial report / policy

1. Introduction

In the nuclear age, open wars between major states have become too costly and dangerous. States increasingly pursue their rivalries indirectly, through militias, insurgents, propaganda and economic pressure. These are proxy wars, and they have shaped conflicts from the Cold War to Yemen, Syria and Ukraine.

Pakistan, located between a hostile India, an unstable Afghanistan and the Gulf-Iran rivalry, has been both a victim of proxy wars and, in the past, a participant in them. The question has two parts, the meaning of proxy war and the external factors in Pakistan’s internal security. This answer argues that external factors clearly play a major role, through sanctuaries, sponsorship and information warfare, but that they exploit internal weaknesses, which Pakistan must fix to defeat them.

Definition: A proxy war is a conflict in which a state (the sponsor) pursues its strategic goals against an adversary indirectly, by arming, financing, training or giving sanctuary to another actor (the proxy), such as an insurgent group, militia or another state, instead of fighting directly, so as to avoid the costs and risks of open war while keeping deniability.

2. Understanding Proxy War

Features

Proxy wars involve a sponsor and a proxy; indirect means such as arms, money, training, sanctuary and propaganda; and deniability, which allows the sponsor to avoid responsibility and escalation.

Why states use proxies

Proxies are cheaper than war, reduce the risk of direct conflict, especially between nuclear states, and allow a state to exploit an adversary’s internal divisions.

Historical examples

The Cold War was fought largely through proxies, in Vietnam, Angola and Afghanistan. Today, Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in Yemen, and many powers fought through proxies in Syria.

Pakistan’s own experience

Pakistan was part of the biggest proxy war of the Cold War, the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, and was later accused of using militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. These policies created blowback that now threatens Pakistan itself.

Syllabus book: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (2011), argues that the US-Pakistan relationship of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s fed the growth of the jihadist networks that now threaten both.

Personality / history: In October 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, visiting Islamabad, warned that “you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours”, a blunt description of the blowback from militant groups nurtured during the Afghan wars.

3. External Factors in Pakistan’s Internal Security

Indian involvement in Balochistan and terrorism

Pakistan accuses India of sponsoring Baloch separatists and the TTP to destabilise Pakistan and sabotage CPEC. Its strongest evidence is the arrest of a serving Indian naval officer in Balochistan.

Official report / policy: Kulbhushan Jadhav, a serving Indian Navy officer, was arrested in Balochistan on 3 March 2016 and convicted by a Pakistani military court of espionage and terrorism. In its judgment of 17 July 2019, the International Court of Justice rejected India’s request to annul the conviction or release him, but held that Pakistan must provide consular access and an effective review of the conviction.

Alleged targeted killings

Reports by international media have alleged Indian covert operations inside Pakistan, which India denies.

Current reference: In April 2024, The Guardian, citing Indian and Pakistani intelligence officials, reported that India’s intelligence agency had carried out targeted killings of about twenty people inside Pakistan since 2020; India rejected the report as “false and malicious propaganda”, while Pakistan said it confirmed its allegations of Indian state-sponsored terrorism.

Afghan sanctuaries

The TTP, its splinter groups and ISIS-K operate from Afghanistan; the UN reports that the Taliban provide the TTP with logistical and financial support. Pakistan alleges that hostile intelligence agencies use Afghan soil against it.

Official report / policy: The UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported (early 2025) that the Afghan Taliban “continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support”, that new TTP training centres had appeared in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika, and that TTP attacks on Pakistan had “significantly increased”, with over 600 in six months; its later report (February 2026) again confirmed the presence of the TTP and ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Sectarian proxy rivalry

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has fuelled sectarian militancy in Pakistan since the 1980s, through funding of madrassas and sectarian groups on both sides, and recruitment of Pakistani fighters for conflicts such as Syria.

Current reference: Sectarian violence still threatens Muslim unity in Pakistan: a suicide bombing at a mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February 2026 killed more than 30 worshippers. The answer of the ulema has been the kind of consensus Shah Waliullah sought: in Paigham-e-Pakistan (2018), more than 1,800 scholars of all schools of thought jointly declared suicide attacks and sectarian killing forbidden.

Information warfare

Disinformation campaigns aim to isolate Pakistan diplomatically and inflame internal divisions, especially in Balochistan and the former FATA.

Current reference: The EU DisinfoLab investigation Indian Chronicles (December 2020) exposed a 15-year India-linked network of more than 750 fake media outlets in 116 countries and revived defunct NGOs, even using the identity of a professor who had died in 2006, to lobby the UN and EU against Pakistan.

Great-power competition and CPEC

CPEC has made Pakistan a target of rivalry; attacks on Chinese workers aim to damage the Pakistan-China partnership and scare away investment.

Current reference: Attacks on Chinese nationals remain CPEC’s biggest threat: a suicide bombing near Dasu (March 2024) killed five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, and a bombing outside Karachi airport (October 2024) killed two Chinese workers.

The state’s framing

The government now calls the TTP “Fitna al-Khawarij” and Baloch militant groups “Fitna al-Hindustan”, explicitly presenting them as foreign-backed proxies.

Current reference: On 11 March 2025, the BLA hijacked the Jaffar Express in Balochistan with more than 400 passengers on board; 26 hostages were killed before security forces ended the siege. The state now calls the TTP “Fitna al-Khawarij” and Baloch militant groups “Fitna al-Hindustan”, signalling that it sees them as foreign-backed.

4. Critical Evaluation

External factors are real

Evidence from UN reports, the Jadhav case and international reporting shows that external actors do exploit Pakistan’s security problems.

But internal factors decide their success

Proxy wars succeed only where there are local grievances to exploit: political exclusion and resource disputes in Balochistan, governance gaps in the merged districts, sectarian divisions, poverty and unemployment. Blaming outsiders alone can become an excuse for not fixing these problems.

Syllabus book: Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), shows how the state’s own use of jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir created the militancy that later turned against Pakistan itself.

Pakistan’s credibility

Pakistan’s own past use of proxies weakens its case internationally; a consistent policy against all militant groups strengthens its hand when it accuses others.

5. How Pakistan Should Counter Proxy Wars

Pakistan should address internal grievances through political dialogue, fair resource sharing and development in Balochistan and the merged districts; strengthen intelligence, police and counter-terrorism departments; implement the National Action Plan against all militant groups without distinction; secure the Afghan border and press the Taliban diplomatically to deny sanctuary; document and present evidence of foreign sponsorship at the UN and in bilateral forums; counter disinformation through credible communication and digital literacy; and protect CPEC projects with dedicated security and local participation.

External factors and the internal weaknesses they exploit

External sponsors: India, Afghan sanctuaries, Gulf-Iran rivalry, disinformation
Proxies: TTP, Baloch militants, sectarian groups, ISIS-K
Internal weaknesses: grievances, weak governance, polarisation

Personality / history: After the Army Public School Peshawar attack (16 December 2014), in which more than 140 people, mostly children, were killed, all political parties and the military agreed on the National Action Plan, the clearest example of civil-military consensus against terrorism.

6. Conclusion

A proxy war is an indirect conflict in which a state uses other actors to fight its rivals while keeping deniability. Pakistan’s internal security is clearly affected by such external factors: alleged Indian sponsorship of terrorism, Afghan sanctuaries for the TTP and ISIS-K, sectarian funding linked to the Gulf-Iran rivalry, disinformation, and attacks aimed at CPEC. But proxies succeed only where internal weaknesses exist. Pakistan can defeat proxy wars not only by exposing its enemies, but by removing the grievances, governance gaps and divisions that they exploit.

More preparation: See all CSS Pakistan Affairs past papers by topic.

Last updated: 2 November 2026.

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Proxy War and Internal Security: CSS 2020 Solved Answer